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This paper addresses the principles of hardship and specif-
ic performance as being unreasonably burdensome or expensive 
both in terms of their definitions and legal consequences. This 
paper argues that, in a situation of hardship, the debtor can 
choose to invoke either the rules of section 6.2 (hardship) or the 
defense to specific performance under Article 7.2.2-b of the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(“UNIDROIT Principles”). Yet, while in a situation where per-
formance of the contract becomes “unreasonably burdensome or 
expensive,” the debtor might only invoke the exception to specific 
performance under Article 7.2.2(b) of the UNIDROIT Principles. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Contingent upon the binding force of the contract, as stipu-
lated in Article 1.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles of Internation-
al Commercial Contracts (“UNIDROIT Principles”), the credi-
tor may generally request the remedy of specific performance 
by the debtor whether the latter’s obligation is monetary or 
non-monetary in nature.  However, this implicitly requires that 
certain important circumstances surrounding the conclusion of 
the contract must remain unchanged.  That is to say, if cir-
cumstances radically change, such change shall be taken into 
consideration when performing the contractual obligations.  
The UNIDROIT Principles address this question from dif-
ferent angles: Chapter six (Performance), section two ( Articles 
6.2.1-6.2.3) regulates the hardship situation under which the 
balance between the two contract parties becomes out of pro-
portion due to drastic changes in the market; Chapter seven 
(Non-Performance), section two (Articles 7.2.1-7.2.5) regulates 
the right to require performance.  In particular, Article 7.2.2(b) 
deals with an exception to the creditor’s right to require specific 
performance, namely where the performance by the debtor of 
his obligation is “unreasonably burdensome or expensive.”  In 
addition, Article 7.1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles deals with 
force majeure, under which performance is rendered impossi-
ble. 
This paper sets out to analyze the situation in which per-
formance becomes significantly more difficult or burdensome, 
but falls short of becoming impossible.  Sections II and III of 
this paper discuss the principles of hardship and performance 
as being unreasonably burdensome or expensive, both in terms 
of definition and legal consequences.  Section IV will examine 
whether a hardship situation and the exception to specific per-
formance under Article 7.2.2(b) overlap, and if so, what choices 
are available to the debtor.  Section V contains concluding re-
marks. 
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II.   HARDSHIP: DEFINITION AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 
A.   Definition of Hardship 
The UNIDROIT section on hardship begins with Article 
6.2.1, stressing that pacta sunt servanda is an underlying prin-
ciple of the UNIDROIT Principles.1  Article 6.2.1 states, in 
part, that “where the performance of a contract becomes more 
onerous for one of the parties, that party is nevertheless bound 
to perform its obligations.”  Thus, the party cannot get out of 
the contract simply because it becomes unprofitable to him.2 
Rather, the contractual obligation must be performed even 
though a change in the market has caused it to become more 
onerous for the debtor.3
According to Article 6.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples, the party can have the contract adapted or termi-
nated in case of hardship.
 
4
                                                 
1 Peter Schlechtriem, Termination and Adjustment of Contracts [Under 
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts], 1 EUR. 
J.L. REFORM 305, 314 (1999) available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ci-
sg/biblio/schlechtriem11.html; Dietrich Maskow, Hardship and Force Maje-
ure, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 661 (1992); Joern Rimke, Force Majeure and 
Hardship: Application in International Trade Practice with Specific Regard to 
the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Contracts, in PACE 
REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF 
GOODS (CISG) 193, 238 (2001), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ci-
sg/biblio/rimke.html#*. 
  Article 6.2.2 defines the hard-
ship event as one that "fundamentally alters the 
equilibrium of the contract either because the cost of a 
party's performance has increased or because the value of 
2 Ole Lando, The CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles in a Global Com-
mercial Code, in MELANGES OFFERTS A MARCEL FONTAINE, 451, 465 (2003). 
3 Ania Carlsen, Can the Hardship Provisions in the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples Be Applied When the CISG is the Governing Law? (Dec. 14, 1998) (un-
published essay, on file with the Pace Law School Institute of International 
Commercial Law), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/pace/can_upicc_hard-
ship_provisions_be_applied_when_cisg_is_governing_law.anja_carlsen/landsc
ape.pdf. 
4 Alexei G. Doudko, Hardship in Contract: The Approach of the 
UNIDROIT Principles and Legal Developments in Russia, UNIFORM L. REV. 
483, 483 (2003) (“pacta sunt servanda… may be questioned when a substan-
tial change of circumstances leads to unfair contractual disequilibrium.”). 
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the performance a party receives has diminished."  For 
example, the cost of a party's performance may increase if 
the price of raw materials or the cost of labor or transpor-
tation increases.5  In  2001, the ICC International Court 
of Arbitration decided that when, after a certain period of 
time, the claimant considerably increased the price of the 
raw material due to the more stringent conditions im-
posed upon the claimant by a governmental agency , the 
good faith principle (also prevailing in international com-
mercial law, e.g. the UNIDROIT Principles Articles 6.2.2 
and 6.2.3) imposes upon the parties the duty to seek out 
an adaptation of their agreement to the new circums-
tances which may have occurred after its execution in or-
der to ensure that its performance does not cause the ruin 
of one of the parties.6  In 2009, the Court of Cassation in 
Belgium concluded that if an unforeseen price rise causes 
a serious imbalance and continued performance at the 
contractual price would be harmful to the seller(i.e., if a 
change in circumstances fundamentally disrupts the con-
tractual equilibrium), the seller has the right to request 
renegotiation of the contract.7
The value of the performance a party receives is dimi-
nished when the purpose of the transaction is frustrated;
 
8 for 
example, if machines are produced for a factory which has since 
stopped its production9 or if goods are bought for the purpose of 
export and subsequently cannot be shipped due to an export 
ban.10
                                                 
5 E. McKendrick, Comment to Performance: Arts 6.2.1 - 6.2.3 – Hardship, 
in COMMENTARY ON THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS (PICC), 711, 717 (2009). 
. In a 1990 arbitral award, the Schiedsgericht  Berlin – 
Germany terminated a contract between an importer of the 
former German Democratic Republic and an eastern European 
exporter for the delivery of machinery; the machinery in ques-
6 Case No. 9994 of 2001, Arbitral Award (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.), available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=1062&step=FullText. 
7 Scafom Int’l BV v. Tubes s.a.s., Case No. C.07.0289.N, available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=1456&step=FullText. 
8 Doudko, supra note 4, at 495. 
9 Maskow, supra note 1, at 662. 
10 McKendrick, supra note 5, at 718. 
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tion lost all value when, following the reunification of Germa-
ny, Western markets were opened to the enterprises of the 
former German Democratic Republic; in order to prove the 
principle that a substantial change in the original contractual 
equilibrium may justify the termination of the contract is in-
creasingly accepted on an international level, the Schiedsge-
richt referred to the provisions on hardship contained in the 
UNIDROIT Principles.11
Obviously, the UNIDROIT Principles recognize hardship 
as an exception to the general rule of pacta sunt servanda.
 
12
In a 1996 arbitral award, the ICC International Court of 
Arbitration, Zürich, stressed that the exceptional nature of 
hardship requires a fundamental alteration in the original con-
tractual equilibrium.
 
13  In other words, the hardship exception 
clearly requires that the debtor cannot be held to his promise 
in spite of the possibility of performance;14  otherwise, this 
would lead to   disruption of the balance between performance 
and counter-performance.15
                                                 
11 Case No. SG 126/90 of 1990, Arbitral Award, Unif. L. Rev. 2001-1, p. 
216, available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=627&st-
ep=Abstract. 
 In this regard, the reason of the al-
12 Maskow, supra note 1, at 661; Doudko, supra note 4, at 494; Denis Tal-
lon, Hardship, in, TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE, 499, 504 (2004). 
13 Case No. 8486 of 1996, Arbitral Award, available at http://www.uni-
lex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=630&step=FullText;Case No. 7365.FMS 
of 1997, Arbitral Award (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.), available at  http://www.unil-
ex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=653&step=Abstract. 
14 Indeed, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 
62) already defines hardship as follows: 
 A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with re-
gard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and 
which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground 
of terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) the existence 
of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of 
the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the change is 
radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed un-
der the treaty. 
15 CHRISTOPH BRUNNER, FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP UNDER GENERAL 
CONTRACT PRINCIPLES: EXEMPTION FOR NON-PERFORMANCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 391 (2007). 
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teration of the original contractual equilibrium does not mat-
ter,16
In the Arbitral Award of ICC International Court of Arbi-
tration numbered 9479, from February 1999, held that a sub-
sequent evolution of the legislative context of a contract, in this 
case, the adoption in 1989 of the European Directive on 
Trademarks (89/104/EEC), does not constitute hardship when 
it does not destroy the balance of the parties’ respective obliga-
tions.
 whether it is a change in law, outbreak of war or revolu-
tion, earthquake, flooding, exceptional weather conditions, 
breakdown of economic systems, etc. 
17
In another case,
 
18
Although performance has become excessively harder, such 
possibility of performance by the debtor generally distinguishes 
the hardship situation from the force majeure situation, where, 
pursuant to Article 7.1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles, perfor-
mance is usually impossible,
 a United States oil company entered into 
a contract with the government of a Newly Independent State 
formerly belonging to the Soviet Union.  The American compa-
ny was to invest a large amount of money and construct a pow-
er station. In return, the company would be granted a long-
term contract for the supply of electricity to customers in that 
State at fixed prices that would be likely to generate a return 
on the investment.  The energy supply system in the State in 
question was later fundamentally changed by law, which made 
it impossible for the power station set up by the American 
company to supply energy at profitable prices.  The ad hoc Ar-
bitral Tribunal concluded that Articles 1.4, 6.2.2 - 6.2.3 and 
7.1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles are applicable. 
19at least temporarily.20
                                                 
16 McKendrick, supra note 5, at 718. 
  In addi-
17 Case No. 9479 of 1999, 2001-03 UNIF. L. REV. 664 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) 
(2001), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=680-
&step=FullText. 
18 Arbitral Award, available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&-
do=case&id=757&step=Abstract. 
19 Tallon, supra note 12, at 499-500; Sarah Howard Jenkins, Exemption 
for Non Performance: UCC, CISG, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES—A Compara-
tive Assessment, 72 TUL. L. REV. 2015, 2027 (1998); Lando, supra note 2, at 
466.  However, there could be certain situations, particularly in cases of eco-
nomic impossibility (i.e., a situation, “short of an absolute bar to perform, but 
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tion, there can also be a hardship situation where the value of 
what the debtor is to receive in exchange for his performance 
has diminished, regardless of his ability to perform.21
Whether an alteration of the equilibrium of the contract is 
fundamental or not in a given case “will of course depend on 
the circumstances.”
. 
22  In all events, fundamental alteration of 
the contract entails that normal economic risks cannot be con-
sidered as hardship;23 in contrast, exceptional changes in the 
market that lie far beyond the normal economic development 
can be.24
                                                                                                             
imposes what in some legal systems is conceptualized as a ‘limit of sacrifice’ 
beyond which the obligor cannot be reasonably expected to perform.”  CISG-
AC Opinion No. 7, cmt. 38, available at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/-
CISG-AC-op7.html). At the same time, these may be considered as cases of 
hardship and of force majeure.  UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.2, cmt. 6, art. 
7.1.1, cmt. 3 (2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/-
contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples2004-e.pdf; Roesler, 
Hannes, Hardship in German Codified Private Law – In Comparative Pers-
pective to English, French and International Contract Law, 3-2007 EU. R. OF 
PRIVATE L. 483-513, 493; Joseph M.Perillo, Force Majeure and Hardship Un-
der the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 5 TUL. 
J. INT'L & COMP. L.  5-28, 21 (1997); Tom Southerington, Impossibility of Per-
formance and Other Excuses in International Trade, B:55 FACULTY OF L. 
UNIV. OF TURKU, n. 4.1 (2001), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ci-
sg/biblio/southerington.html. 
  The Official Comment on the UNIDROIT Principles, 
the 1994 edition, adopted a general threshold test. It states:  
“an alteration amounting to 50% or more of the cost or the val-
20 Roesler, supra note 19, at 485; Rimke, supra note 1, at 201. 
21 Southerington, supra note 19, at n. 2.4. 
22 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.2, cmt. 1 (2004), available 
at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integra
lversionprinciples2004-e.pdf; Joseph Lookofsky, Impediments and Hardship 
in International Sales: Commentary on Catherine Kessedjian's Competing 
Approaches to Force Majeure and Hardship, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON., 434, 
440 (2005), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookof-
sky17.html; McKendrick, supra note 5, at 719; Brunner, supra note 15, at 
426; Rimke, supra note 1, at 239. 
23 Maskow, supra note 1, at 662; Brunner, supra note 15, at 416; Carlsen, 
supra note 3, at 3. 
24 Doudko, supra note 4, at 494; Maskow, supra note 1, at 662; Catherine 
Kessedjian,  Competing Approaches to Force Majeure and Hardship, 25 INT’L 
R. L. & ECON.  641(2005), pp. 641-670, 421, available at http://www.ci-
sg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/kessedjian.html;Schlechtriem, supra note 1, at 
314. 
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ue of the performance is likely to amount to a ‘fundamental’ al-
teration.”25  Due to criticism by some writers, the 2004 
UNIDROIT Principles edition did not provide for this general 
threshold test.26 Nevertheless, if the changed circumstances re-
sult in less than fifty percent decrease in value of the perfor-
mance to be received or less than fifty percent increase in the 
cost of performance, then the fundamental alteration of the 
equilibrium of the contract is not realized under Article 6.2.2.27  
This is already supported by the international arbitration prac-
tice,28 according to which cost increases of thirteen point six 
percent, thirty percent, forty-four percent, or twenty-five to fif-
ty percent were not considered to be fundamental alterations of 
the equilibrium of the contracts.29  In contrast, if this percent 
exceeds fifty, the fundamental alteration of the contract will 
likely be achieved.30  Arguably, this fifty percent threshold is 
reasonable in international commercial contracts in which the 
value is normally high so that any small currency fluctuation 
could result in a huge loss.31
In 2009, the Court of Cassation of Belgium decided a case 
involving several contracts between a Dutch buyer and French 
seller entered into several contracts with seller, a French com-
pany, for the delivery of steel tubes.
 
32
                                                 
25 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.2, cmt. 2 (1994). 
   The unexpected rise in 
26 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 428. 
27 Maskow, supra note 1, at 662; Perillo, supra note 19, at 22; Jenkins, 
supra note 19, at 2028; Doudko, supra note 4, at 495; Rimke, supra note 1, at 
239. 
28 Doudko, supra note 4, at 496. 
29 Id. In the case Nouva Fucinati S.p.A v. Fondmetall Int’l A.B, though it 
was not concerned with the UNIDROIT Principles, the Tribunale Civile di 
Monza (Italy) decided, on January 14, 1993, that the price increase between 
the time of the conclusion of the contract and the time fixed for delivering the 
goods sold by approximately thirty percent did not amount to hardship; see 
this decision at: http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=21&st-
ep=Abstract. 
30 McKendrick, supra note 5, at 719; Carlsen supra note 3, at 3; 
BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 432 (stating that the threshold shall be eighty to 
one hundred percent decrease in the value received or a corresponding in-
crease in the cost of performance). 
31 Doudko, supra note 4, at 496. 
32 Hof van Cassatie [Cass.][Court of Cassation], June 19, 2009, AR 
C.07.0289, available at http://www.cass.be (Belg.). 
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the price of the steel by seventy percent was considered a 
change in circumstances that fundamentally disrupted the con-
tractual equilibrium; thus, the debtor (the seller) had the right 
to request renegotiation of the contract.33
In addition to the basic definition of the hardship event
 
34
a. The event must become known to the debtor after 
the conclusion of the contract;  
 
mentioned above, Article 6.2.2 stipulates further conditions 
that the hardship event must satisfy.  These are as follows: 
b. The event could not reasonably have been taken in-
to consideration by the debtor at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract; 
c. The event is beyond the control of the debtor; and 
d. The occurrence of the event was an unassumed risk 
by the debtor. 
With regards to the first condition, it is of no importance 
whether the event occurred before or after the conclusion of the 
contract;35  rather, it suffices if the debtor knows such an event 
after the conclusion of the contract. “If [the debtor] had known 
of those events when entering into the contract, it would have 
been able to take them into account at that time and may not 
subsequently rely on hardship.”36
As for the second condition, even if the event that funda-
mentally altered the equilibrium of the contract became known 
 
                                                 
33 Notably, the law applicable to this contract was CISG. Neither the con-
tract itself includes a price adjustment clause, nor does CISG expressly settle 
the question of hardship. Thus, the court after pointing out that in order for 
gaps in CISG to be filled in a uniform manner, regard must be had to the 
general principles governing the law of international commerce, which in-
cludes, among others, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts. 
34 Rimke, supra note 1, at 239(the definition of hardship has “the form of 
a general description”). 
35 Maskow, supra note 1, at 662; contra Carlsen, supra note 3, at 3; Case 
No. 9029 of 1988, Arbitral Award (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.), available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=660&step=FullText 
(stating that hardship may be invoked in such an event takes place after the 
conclusion of the contract). 
36 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.2, cmt. 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf  
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to the debtor after the conclusion of the contract, it could rea-
sonably have been into account by him at the time the contract 
was concluded.  For example, the following circumstances shall 
be considered foreseeable: failure of a central bank to grant au-
thorization to pay in foreign currency when foreign exchange 
control regulations were in place at the time of contracting;37 
armed hostilities between countries with a history of antagon-
ism;38 and political or environmental instability in a certain 
country at the time of conclusion.39  Because such events were 
foreseeable but the debtor did not take them into consideration 
when concluding the contract, then the debtor should bear the 
burden.40  Also, if the contract contains a provision on the allo-
cation of risks of certain event, this event is deemed to be clear-
ly foreseen and thus, hardship rules of the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples may not be applied.41  As for the third condition, the 
UNIDROIT Principles clearly state that the hardship event 
impeding performance must be external to the party invoking 
it; the debtor may not rely on self-induced hardship.42 That is 
to say, the difficulties of performance by the debtor may not be 
the result of its own act or negligence.43
The hardship event is normally beyond the debtor’s control 
when it is a natural event or act of God.  Strikes by employees, 
however, may raise some problems,
 
44
                                                 
37 Frederick R. Fucci, Hardship and Changed Circumstances as Grounds 
for Adjustment or Non-Performance of Contracts, 2006 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. 
REP. at 17, available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/calendar/spring20-
06materials.html. 
 if the employees are em-
ployed by a third party, the strike will be considered to be 
beyond the control of the aggrieved debtor.   Yet, if they are 
employed by the aggrieved party himself, then the strike will 
most likely be within his control because he could have over-
come the strike by satisfying the demands of his employees. 
38 Id. 
39 McKendrick, supra note 5, at 721. 
40 Perillo, supra note 19, at 23. 
41 Roesler, supra note 19, at 484; Maskow, supra note 1, at 663; McKen-
drick, supra note 5, at 713; BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 424. 
42 Doudko, supra note 4, at 497. 
43 Roesler, supra note 19, at 485. 
44 McKendrick, supra note 5, at 721. 
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As far as the fourth condition is concerned, there can be no 
hardship if the debtor has assumed the risk of the change in 
the circumstances; assumption of the risk by the debtor may be 
explicit or implicit.45
The word "assumption" makes it clear that the risks need not 
have been taken over expressly, but that this may follow from the 
very nature of the contract. A party who enters into a speculative 
transaction is deemed to accept a certain degree of risk, even 
though it may not have been fully aware of that risk at the time 
it entered into the contract. 
  In this respect, the Official Comment on 
Article 6.2.2 further states:  
Thus, as contracts to sell shares of stock on the stock ex-
change46 or insurance contracts47 are aleatory in nature (i.e. 
depending on chance or contingency), the debtor may not be re-
lieved even if unexpected and unforeseeable events disrupted 
the market.48  Furthermore, in the context of a distributorship 
agreement concerning specific quantities of goods to be deli-
vered, for example, a vegetable grower typically takes on the 
risk of crop destruction by rainstorms and flooding and cannot 
therefore invoke hardship.49
In another case
 
50
                                                 
45 Maskow, supra note 1, at 663. McKendrick, supra note 5, at 721. 
 where the plaintiff, a Lithuanian compa-
ny, entered into a contract with defendant, a Lithuanian indi-
vidual, for the sale of its shares, the defendant, after having 
46 Perillo, supra note 19, at 14. 
47 James Gordley, Impossibility and Changed Unforeseen Circumstances, 
52 AM. J. COMP. L. 513, 525 (2004), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/-
cisg/biblio/gordley1.html.   
48 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 424-25; Doudko, supra note 4, at 500. 
49 Certified Award (Arbitraje de Mexico, 2006), available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=1149&step=Fulltext  
(“While agreeing that the meteorological events in question had sub-
stantially increased the costs of Defendant’s performance, the Arbitral 
Tribunal found that another essential requirement for the occurrence of 
hardship as defined in Article 6.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles was 
missing, i.e. that the risk of the event fundamentally altering the equi-
librium of the contract was not assumed by the disadvantaged par-
ty..."). 
50 G.Brencius v. Ukio investicine grupe, (S.C. 2003) (Lithuania), availa-
ble at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=1183&step=Full-
Text. 
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made a down payment of twenty percent of the total price, re-
fused to pay the balance. When the plaintiff sued the defendant 
demanding the payment of the outstanding sum, the defendant 
invoked hardship on the ground that the company had become 
insolvent and, as a result, the value of the shares was consi-
derably diminished.  In its decision, the Supreme Court of Li-
thuania, ruled that defendant was not entitled to invoke the 
doctrine of changed circumstances or hardship as the latter 
does not apply to monetary obligations and furthermore, in the 
case at hand the risk of fluctuations of the price of the shares 
was deemed to be assumed by the defendant.  In this respect 
the court referred to Article 6.204 of the Lithuanian Civil Code 
which in substance, according to the court, corresponds to Ar-
ticles 6.2.1 to 6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles. 
Notably, if the first basic condition is met, meaning there 
has been a change in the market that fundamentally altered 
the equilibrium of the contract, then all four conditions are 
met.51
     In all events, the debtor may not rely on hardship if he 
has already performed his obligation; the hardship defense 
may only be claimed in regards to performance yet to be ren-
dered.
  Once the event disturbs the original contractual equili-
brium and becomes known to the debtor after the conclusion of 
the contract, it is quite clear that the debtor could not reasona-
bly have been able to take it into account, could not preclude or 
overcome it, and could not assume the risk of its occurrence. 
52  If the fundamental disequilibrium of the contract oc-
curs at a time when performance has been only partially ren-
dered, the hardship defense can only be invoked in regards to 
the parts of the performance not yet rendered.53
                                                 
51 Kessedjian, supra note 24, at 421. 
 
52 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.2, cmt. 4, available at http://www.uni-
droit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples
2004-e.pdf  
(“By its very nature hardship can only become of relevance with respect 
to performances still to be rendered: once a party has performed, it is no 
longer entitled to invoke a substantial increase in the costs of its per-
formance or a substantial decrease in the value of the performance it 
receives as a consequence of a change in circumstances which occurs af-
ter such performance.”). 
53 Id. 
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B.  Legal Consequences of Hardship 
In a situation of hardship, Article 6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles mandate renegotiation between the parties to adapt 
the contract to the new circumstances; the debtor is "entitled 
to request renegotiations" of the contract. Article 6.2.3 itself 
does not oblige the creditor to participate in the renegotia-
tions.54F54  Yet, such a duty results from two other principles set 
forth in the UNIDROIT Principles:55F55 good faith, Article 1.7, 56F56 
which is indeed the underlying legal basis of the hardship ex-
emption,57F57, and cooperation, Article 5.1.3.58F58 The principle of 
party autonomy also supports the duty to renegotiate. It is bet-
ter that the parties themselves agree upon the alternative con-
tractual terms that deal with the consequences of the hardship 
event.59F59  The mere fact that either party may resort to court 
drives the parties to agree on such terms.60F60  In addition, since 
the provisions of hardship is placed under section six regard-
ing performance of the contract, it follows that the UNIDROIT 
Principles aim at keeping the contract between the parties in-
                                                 
54 McKendrick, supra note 5, at 722. 
55 Id. 
56 Luke Nottage, Changing Contract Lenses: Unexpected Supervening 
Events in English, New Zealand, U.S., Japanese, and International Sales 
Law and Practice, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 385, 406 (2007); Perillo, su-
pra note 20, at 25; Schlechtriem, supra note 1, at 319.    
57 Tallon, supra note 12, at 503; BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 480; Doudko, 
supra note 4, at 490; Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran v Cubic Defense Systems, Inc., Case No. 
7365/FMS of 1997 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.), available at http://www.unilex.in-
fo/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=653&step=Fulltext; Case No. 9994 of 2001 
(ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&-
do=case&id=1062&step=Abstract. 
58 Southerington, supra note 19, at n.4.3; Doudko, supra note 4, at 502; 
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 5 (2004), available at  http://www.uni-
droit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples
2004-e.pdf (“Although nothing is said in this Article to that effect, both the 
request for renegotiations by the disadvantaged party and the conduct of both 
parties during the renegotiation process are subject to the general principle of 
good faith (Art. 1.7) and to the duty of cooperation (Art. 5.1.3)."). 
59 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 480. 
60 Tallon, supra note 12, at 504. 
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tact as far as possible, even in the presence of a hardship 
event.61
The debtor must indicate the grounds on which his re-
quest for renegotiations is based.
 
62  He may not request rene-
gotiations as a purely tactical maneuver.63 He shall also re-
quest renegotiations without undue delay64 after the time at 
which the hardship event is claimed to have occurred, meaning 
at the earliest possible opportunity65 under the given circums-
tances.66  Nevertheless, delayed request by the debtor does not 
exclude his right to request renegotiations;67 it may, however, 
affect the finding as to whether hardship actually existed and, 
if so, its consequences for the contract.68
                                                 
61 Ugo Draetta, Hardship and Force Majeure Clauses in International 
Contracts, 3-4 INT'L BUS. L.J. 347, 349 (2002); Perrillo, supra note 19, at 15; 
BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 400. 
 
62 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt.3 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf  
("Para. (1) of this Article also imposes on the disadvantaged party a duty 
to indicate the grounds on which the request for renegotiations is based 
so as to permit the other party better to assess whether or not the re-
quest for renegotiations is justified. An incomplete request is to be con-
sidered as not being raised in time, unless the grounds of the alleged 
hardship are so obvious that they need not be spelt out in the request.");  
McKendrick, supra note 5, at 723, BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 486; Rimke, 
supra note 1, at 239. 
63 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 5 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf; Doudko, supra note 4, at 502. 
64 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf  
(“The request for renegotiations must be made as quickly as possible af-
ter the time at which hardship is alleged to have occurred (para. (1)). 
The precise time for requesting renegotiations will depend upon the cir-
cumstances of the case: it may, for instance, be longer when the change 
in circumstances takes place gradually.”);  
Rimke, supra note 1, at 239. 
65 McKendrick, supra note 5, at 722. 
66 Bunner, supra note 15, at 486. 
67 Rimke, supra note 1, at 239. 
68 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf.  
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Once the debtor claims the existence of a hardship situa-
tion, the creditor cannot simply dismiss this claim.69 If the 
debtor’s claim for hardship has a legitimate basis, refusal to 
renegotiate by the creditor can later be construed by the court 
or arbitral tribunal to his disadvantage.70  The debtor may not, 
however, claim either damages or termination of the contract 
due to the creditor’s refusal to renegotiate.71  If the creditor 
agrees to renegotiate, then he must negotiate in good faith;72 
furthermore, he may not break off negotiations in bad faith.73
The parties are eventually allocated the responsibility to 
resolve the disequilibrium of their contract.
 
74
                                                 
69 BRUNNER, supra note 15, 485; UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 5 
(2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/prin-
ciples2004/integralversionprinciples2004-e.pdf("both parties must conduct 
the negotiation in a constructive manner, in particular by refraining from any 
form of obstruction and by providing all the necessary information."). 
  In Lemire v. 
70 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 483; Fucci, supra note 38, at 30. 
71 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 481-82. 
72 Lando, supra note 2, at 467. 
73 The UNIDROIT Principles explicitly state:  
(1) A party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach an 
agreement. 
(2) However, a party who negotiates or breaks off negotiations in bad 
faith is liable for the losses caused to the other party. 
(3) It is bad faith, in particular, for a party to enter into or continue ne-
gotiations when intending not to reach an agreement with the other par-
ty.   
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 2.1.15 (2004), available at http://www.unidr-
oit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples20
04-e.pdf. 
74 Jenkins, supra note 19, at 2028. 
16 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol. 2:5 
2010] 
 
Ukraine,75
In addition, the hardship event does not automatically re-
sult in an exemption from non-performance.
 the International Centre for the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes (“ICSID”) endorsed the settlement agreed 
upon by the parties after negotiation. 
76. Indeed, the 
second paragraph of Article 6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles 
explicitly states that the request for renegotiation does not, in 
itself, entitle the debtor to withhold performance.77  This is also 
supported by case law; an Arbitral Tribunal rejected a defen-
dant’s argument that his liability for non-performance was ex-
cluded on the ground of hardship, stating that even if the 
events were to be considered a case of hardship, the effect 
would not be the exclusion of the defendant’s liability for its 
non-performance, but only the right to ask for renegotiation of 
the distributorship agreement with a view to adapting it to the 
changed circumstances.78
                                                 
75 Lemire v. Ukraine, (U.S. v. Ukr.), ICSID ARB(AF)/98/1 (Mar. 20, 
2000), available at: 
 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=962-
&step=Abstract.  
In this case, a national of the United States and the Government of the 
Ukraine entered into an investment agreement concerning the establishment 
by the former of broadcasting stations in the Ukraine. The parties submitted 
their dispute as to the proper performance of the agreement to the Interna-
tional Centre for the Settlement of Disputes (ICSID). After the commence-
ment of the arbitral proceedings the parties entered into negotiations that 
resulted in a settlement agreement between them, which contained provi-
sions taken literally, with a few minor adaptations, from the UNDROIT Prin-
ciples, particularly from Articles 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3 dealing with hardship and 
its consequences. Id. 
76 Southerington, supra note 20, at n. 4.1. 
77 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 4 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf (“Para. (2) of this Article provides that the request 
for renegotiations does not of itself entitle the disadvantaged party to with-
hold performance. The reason for this lies in the exceptional character of 
hardship and in the risk of possible abuses of the remedy. Withholding per-
formance may be justified only in extraordinary circumstances.”). 
78 Arbitral Award of Centro de Arbitraje de México (CAM), Nov. 30, 
2006, available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=1149-
&step=Abstract (the UNILEX database does not supply the party names or a 
case identifier for this particular arbitration). However, the present writer 
does not agree with the Arbitral Tribunal that the only remedy available to 
the debtor in cases of hardship is “to ask for renegotiation of the … agree-
ment with a view to adapting it to the changed circumstances.”  Id.  It is true 
ALTERATION OF THE CONTRACTUAL 
EQUILIBRIUM UNDER THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES                                                      
 
Nevertheless, withholding may, follow from the severe im-
pact of the hardship event.79
A enters into a contract with B for the construction of a plant. 
The plant is to be built in country X, which adopts new safety 
regulations after the conclusion of the contract. The new regula-
tions require additional apparatus and thereby fundamentally al-
ter the equilibrium of the contract making A’s performance sub-
stantially more onerous. A is entitled to request renegotiations 
and may withhold performance in view of the time it needs to 
implement the new safety regulations, but it may also withhold 
the delivery of the additional apparatus, for as long as the cor-
responding price adaptation is not agreed. 
 Pursuant to the Official Comment 
and Illustration number four  on Article 6.2.3 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles, withholding of performance by the deb-
tor may be justified in the following situation:  
It should be noted that the debtor, when requesting rene-
gotiations, may either claim adaptation or termination of the 
contract.80  Nevertheless, there is no duty on the parties to nec-
essarily achieve a settlement.81  Therefore, if the parties cannot 
agree on termination or adaptation of the contract within a 
"reasonable" time, regardless of the cause of their failure to 
reach such an agreement,82 either party may resort to court.83
                                                                                                             
that the debtor has, first of all, to request renegotiations. But, if the parties 
do not agree to a settlement, either of them can resort to the court which in 
turn might, inter alia, terminate the contract. Moreover, termination may be 
requested from the early beginning by the debtor if the changed circums-
tances so require. That is to say, nothing in the Unidroit Principles precludes 
the parties from agreeing on termination without resorting to the court. 
  
79 McKendrick, supra note 5, at 723.  
80 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 508; Lando, supra note 2, at 467. 
81 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 485. 
82 McKendrick, supra note 5, at 723. 
83 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 6 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf. 
“If the parties fail to reach agreement on the adaptation of the contract 
to the changed circumstances within a reasonable time, para. (3) of the 
present Article authorises either party to resort to the court. Such a situation 
may arise either because the non-disadvantaged party completely ignored the 
request for renegotiations or because the renegotiations, although conducted 
by both parties in good faith, did not achieve a positive outcome. 
How long a party must wait before resorting to the court will depend on 
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In any event, the debtor is not entitled to declare termination 
of the contract of its own accord.84  It is worth mentioning that 
the debtor may not resort to court without having previously 
made a request for renegotiations;85 otherwise, the court should 
suspend the proceedings for a reasonable period of time to ena-
ble the parties to renegotiate.86  The term "court" should be un-
derstood to mean the dispute resolution mechanism agreed 
upon by the parties to the contract,87 whether it is a state court 
or an arbitral tribunal.88
According to Article 6.2.3 and the Official Comment there-
on, the court,- if it finds a hardship situation, is authorized to 
grant four possible options of relief:
 
89 (1) terminate the contract 
at a specified date and on terms to be fixed;90 (2) adapt the con-
tract with a view to restoring its equilibrium;91
                                                                                                             
the complexity of the issues to be settled and the particular circumstances of 
the case.”  Id. 
 (3) direct the 
84 Case No. 10021 of 2000, (ICC Int’l. Ct. Arb.), available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=832&step=FullText. 
85 Lando, supra note at 2, 466; Case No. 10021 of 2000, (ICC Int’l. Ct. 
Arb.), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=832&-
step=FullText. 
86 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 489. 
87 Kessedjian, supra note 24, at 422. 
88 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 1.7 (2004), available at http://www.uni-
droit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples
2004-e.pdf (“In these Principles – ‘court’ includes an arbitral tribunal.”). 
89 Jenkins, supra note 19, at 2029. 
90 This relief is expressly provided in UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, 
cmt. 7 (2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/con-
tracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples2004-e.pdf  (“A first possibility 
is for it to terminate the contract. However, since termination in this case 
does not depend on a non-performance by one of the parties, its effects on the 
performances already rendered might be different from those provided for by 
the rules governing termination in general (Arts. 7.3.1. et seq.). Accordingly, 
para. (4)(a) provides that termination shall take place ‘at a date and on terms 
to be fixed’ by the court.”); Case No. 7365/FMS of 1997, (ICC Int’l. Ct. Arb.), 
available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=653&st-
ep=FullText;  1999-4 UNIF. L. REV. 11014, 1014-15 (1999).  1015. 
91 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 7 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf (: (“Another possibility would be for a court to adapt 
the contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium (para. (4)(b)). In so doing 
the court will seek to make a fair distribution of the losses between the par-
ties.”); McKendrick, supra note 5, at 724; Rimke, supra note 1, at 240; Case 
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parties to resume negotiations to reach an agreement adapting 
the contract;92 or (4) confirm the terms of the contract as origi-
nally agreed.93  All options stand on equal footing;94 there is no 
preference for any particular option.95
The court may not terminate or adapt the contract on its 
own.
  
96 Rather either party shall request such a relief before the 
court.  The court may declare termination ex nunc (for the fu-
ture) or ex tunc (with a retroactive effect).97  When terminating 
the contract, the court may do so upon conditions it determines, 
such as the payment of compensation.98  When adapting the 
contract, the court may increase or reduce the price or quanti-
ty, extend or alter the period of performance, or order compen-
sation.99
                                                                                                             
No. 7365/FMS of 1997, (ICC Int’l. Ct. Arb.), available at http://www.uni-
lex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=653&step=FullText; 1999-4 UNIF. L. 
REV. 1014, 1015-15 (1999). 
  The court may not, in any event, impose a new con-
92 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 7 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf; Rimke, supra note 1, at 240.;McKendrick, supra 
note 5, at 724. 
93 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 7 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf (“Para. (4) of this Article expressly states that the 
court may terminate or adapt the contract only when this is reasonable. The 
circumstances may even be such that neither termination nor adaptation is 
appropriate and in consequence the only reasonable solution will be for the 
court either to direct the parties to resume negotiations with a view to reach-
ing agreement on the adaptation of the contract, or to confirm the terms of 
the contract as they stand.”); McKendrick, supra note 5, at 724. 
94 But see Doudko, supra note 4, at 504 (“Though the Principles do not 
expressly prefer the adaptation remedy it is nevertheless, regarded as the 
backbone principle of its hardship provisions.”). 
95 Roesler, supra note 19, at 505; BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 407, 409-
510. 
96 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 511; Doudko, supra note 4, at 504. 
97 BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 511. 
98 Id. at 512. 
99 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.3, cmt. 7 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf  (“This may or may not, depending on the nature of 
the hardship, involve a price adaptation. However, if it does, the adaptation 
will not necessarily reflect in full the loss entailed by the change in circums-
tances, since the court will, for instance, have to consider the extent to which 
one of the parties has taken a risk and the extent to which the party entitled 
to receive a performance may still benefit from that performance.”). 
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tract upon the parties.100  Taking into account that judges in 
some countries are not allowed to adapt the contract, the guid-
ance of paragraph four of Article 6.2.3 will be extremely diffi-
cult to follow by all courts around the world.101  Furthermore, 
judges are not always specialized or aware of economic rela-
tions and conditions.102
In addition, the court may order renegotiations as the only 
possible solution when it becomes obvious that the court’s in-
tervention to adapt or terminate is not reasonable. As for the 
last option of relief, it would obviously lead to a situation in 
which the debtor has to continue to carry the burden of hard-
ship, which seems to be contrary to the rationale of hardship 
under the UNIDROIT Principles.
  Thus, the decision to adapt the con-
tract may be more easily determined by an arbitral tribunal 
than by a state court. 
103
III.   SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IS UNREASONABLY BURDENSOME 
OR EXPENSIVE: DEFINITION AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 
  Notably, the most current 
case law available, shows that tribunals, do not refuse to revise 
the contract by a declaration that the contract be performed as 
originally agreed. 
A.  When Specific Performance is Unreasonably Burdensome or 
Expensive 
Specific performance is dealt with differently among the 
major legal systems in the world.104F 04  Whereas common law ju-
risdictions consider it as an exceptional remedy, most civil law 
systems treat it as a primary remedy.105F 05  Thus, the 
                                                 
100 Doudko, supra note 4,at 505. 
101 Kessedjian, supra note 24, at 422; BRUNNER, supra note 15, at 401. 
102 Kessedjian, supra note 24, at 422. 
103 Draetta, supra note 61, at 350. 
104 Ingeborg Schwenzer, Specific Performance and Damages According to 
the 1994 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 1-3 
EUR. J. L. REFORM  289-303, 290 (1999) available at: http://www.cisg.law.pa-
ce.edu/cisg/biblio/schwenzer1.html. 
105 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.2, cmt. 1 . (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf (“[E]ach party should as a rule be entitled to re-
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UNIDROIT Principles has sought a compromise: the 
UNIDROIT Principles establish on the one hand the right to 
performance as a general rule,106 like civil law systems;107 on 
the other hand, the UNIDROIT Principles also include numer-
ous exceptions, which in turn resemble the more restrictive ap-
proach of common law systems.108
The UNIDROIT Principles make a clear distinction be-
tween specific performance of monetary and non-monetary ob-
ligations. With regard to monetary obligations, Article 7.2.1 of 
the UNIDROIT Principles recognizes specific performance 
completely,
  
109 without exceptions.110
                                                                                                             
quire performance by the other party …. While this is not controversial in civ-
il law countries, common law systems allow enforcement of non-monetary ob-
ligations only in special circumstances.”); H.Schelhaas,  Comment to Non-
Performance in General, Arts. 7.1.1 - 7.1.7, in COMMENTARY ON THE UNIDROIT 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (PICC) 728-76, 783-84  
(S. Vogenauer & J. Kleinheisterkamp eds., 2009).  
  The Official Comment 
clearly states the right of the creditor to require repair or re-
106 Schwenzer, supra note 104, at 296; John Felemegas, The Right to Re-
quire Performance: Comparison between the provisions of the CISG (Arts. 28, 
46, and 62) and Counterpart Provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles (Arts. 
7.2.1 – 7.2.5), in AN INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF 
GOODS (1980) AS UNIFORM SALES LAW 143-63, 155 (John Felemegas ed., 2007).   
107 Mahdi Zahraa & Aburima Ghith, Specific Performance in the Light of 
the CISG, the Unidroit Principles and Libyan Law, 2002-3 REV. DR. UNIF. 
751-74. 758 (2002).  
108 Id. at 759-60; Schwenzer, supra note 104, at 292. 
109 Lando, supra note 2, at 468. Notably, according to the Official Com-
ment on Article 7.2.1, this rule is adopted in order to “reflect the generally 
accepted principle that payment of money which is due under a contractual 
obligation can always be demanded and, if the demand is not met, enforced 
by legal action before a court.” UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.1, cmt. 1 . 
(2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/prin-
ciples2004/integralversionprinciples2004-e.pdf 
110 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.1, cmt. (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf 
(“Where a party who is obliged to pay money does not do so, the other 
party may require payment.”). In exceptional situations however, “the 
right to require payment of the price of the goods or services to be deli-
vered or rendered may be excluded. This is in particular the case where 
a usage (Article 1.9 UP) requires a seller to resell goods which are nei-
ther accepted nor paid for by the buyer.”)   
Id.  
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placement of the payment of money by the debtor. For instance, 
in the case of an insufficient payment, payment in the wrong 
currency, or to an account different from that agreed upon by 
the parties.111
Article 7.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles recognizes the 
claim for specific performance of non-monetary obligations in 
general; however, specific performance is excluded in several 
special situations.
 
112  Admittedly, the right to specific perfor-
mance is in accord with the principle of pacta sunt serven-
da,113 that is, the binding force of contractual obligations un-
derlying the UNIDROIT Principles Article 1.3.114
Article 7.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles applies the afo-
resaid general principles (Articles 7.2.1 and 7.2.2) to the defec-
tive performance.
  In addition, 
specific performance by the debtor gives the creditor to the 
greatest extent possible what is due to him under the contract. 
115
                                                 
111 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.3, cmt. 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf; see also Schwenzer, supra note 104, at 293. 
  Article 7.2.3 confirms that the right to 
require specific performance in such a case includes the right of 
the party who has received a defective performance to require 
“repair, replacement, or other cure of defective performance;” 
for example, the removal of the rights of third persons over 
goods or the obtaining of a necessary public permission. 
112 Contrary to CISG (Article 28), the Unidroit Principles do not treat the 
right to require performance as a discretionary remedy that depends on do-
mestic law and the rules of the forum; the court must grant the aggrieved 
party specific performance of non-monetary obligations, unless one of the ex-
ceptions enumerated in Article 7.2.2 applies.  UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 
7.2.2, cmt. 2 (2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/-
contracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples2004-e.pdf; Felemegas, su-
pra note 106, at 155; Schwenzer, supra note 104, at 292; Lando, supra note 2, 
at 469-90. 
113 Schelhaas, supra note 105, at 784. 
114 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.2, cmt. 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf (“In accordance with the general principle of the 
binding character of the contract (see Art. 1.3), each party should as a rule be 
entitled to require performance by the other party.”) 
115 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.3, cmt. 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf.  
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Among the exceptions to the specific performance of the 
non-monetary obligation is the situation in which “performance 
or, where relevant, enforcement is unreasonably burdensome 
or expensive,” as stated in Article 7.2.2(b). Clearly, the general 
principle of reasonableness underlying the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples is the basis of this exception.116  Exclusion of specific 
performance in “this [situation] could also be seen as an exten-
sion of the operation of the principle of good faith.”117  With 
regard to this exceptional situation, the Official Comment on 
Article 7.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles further states:  “par-
ticularly when there has been a drastic change of circums-
tances after the conclusion of a contract, performance, although 
still possible, may have become so onerous that it would run 
counter to the general principle of good faith and fair dealing 
(Art. 1.7) to require it.”118
According to this exception, performance cannot, therefore, 
be required if it would involve the debtor in unreasonable effort 
or expense due to a drastic change of circumstances after the 
contract conclusion.
 
119  The question is when is effort or ex-
pense unreasonable? One author suggests a comparative eco-
nomic assessment: The economic costs and benefits of the per-
formance shall be balanced against each other; that is to say, 
the court shall weigh up both parties’ interests against the pos-
sibility of specific performance.120
First, considerations as to the reasonableness of the trans-
  
                                                 
116 Felemegas, supra note 106, at 155. 
117 Schelhaas, supra note 105, at 789; Zahraa & Ghith, supra note 107, at 
760; Chengwei Liu, Specific Performance: Perspectives from the CISG, 
UNIDROIT Principles, PECL and Case Law  29 (2005), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/chengwei3.html (quoting Jarno Van-
to, Remarks on the Manner in which the Principles of European Contract Law 
May be Used to Interpret or Supplement Article 46 of the CISG, PRINCIPLES OF 
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW,  http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/peclcomp-
46.html.). 
118 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.2, cmt. 3 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf.  
119 Zahraa & Ghith, supra note 107, at 760. 
120 Schelhaas, supra note 105, at 790. 
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action itself or of the appropriateness of the counter-
performance are irrelevant in this context.121  Likewise, spe-
cific performance will not be excluded merely because damages 
might be an adequate remedy.122 Also, specific performance 
will normally be granted in cases in which the subject matter of 
the contract is something unique and/or irreplaceable in na-
ture; that is, something not easily available elsewhere.123
In contrast, specific performance will not be ordered if the 
performance would be quite different to the original obligation; 
for example, a lessee who has carelessly burned down the 
leased premises will not be ordered to re-build them.
 
124
[I]n common law systems it is the courts and not the [creditors] 
who supervise the execution of orders for specific performance. As 
a consequence, in certain cases, especially those involving per-
formances extended in time, courts in those countries refuse spe-
cific performance if supervision would impose undue burdens 
upon courts.
  In 
many cases involving small, insignificant defects, both re-
placement and repair may involve unreasonable effort or ex-
pense and are therefore excluded.  In addition, the wording 
"where relevant, enforcement," contained in Article 7.2.2(b) of 
the UNIDROIT Principles, takes into account the following 
fact:  
125
B. Legal Consequences of Specific Performance Being 
Unreasonably Burdensome or Expensive 
One of the consequences that arise from the exception 
stated in Article 7.2.2(b) of the UNIDROIT Principles is clearly 
the exclusion of specific performance of the obligation.  Unlike 
the case of hardship where the contract is terminated and con-
                                                 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 790-91;  Zahraa & Ghith, supra note 107, at 769. 
124 Liu, supra note 117, at 29. 
125 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.2, cmt. 3 (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf; see also  Schelhaas, supra note 105, at 792; 
Schwenzer, supra note 104, at 297. 
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sequently the obligation as a whole, including eventual damag-
es, comes to an end,
 
126 Article 7.2.2(b) only brings the enforced 
performance of the obligation to an end.  This means, in such 
an exceptional situation, other remedies, especially damages,127 
are more adequate remedies for the creditor128 unless the deb-
tor proves the existence of an impediment according to Article 
7.1.7.129  In appropriate cases, however, the debtor may also 
request termination of the contract.130
If this exception only applies to a part of performance, for 
example, the delivery of part of the goods sold is unreasonably 
burdensome or expensive, then specific performance of this 
part only is excluded. Thus, the rest of the contract must be 
performed unless the obligation itself is indivisible.  
 
IV.  CHOICE BY THE DEBTOR BETWEEN HARDSHIP RULES AND 
EXCEPTION OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
Hardship normally applies to duration contracts, for ex-
ample, “where the performance of at least one party extends 
over a certain period of time.”131F131  The nature of the obligation 
arising from the contract is irrelevant, whether it is to deliver 
something or to do or abstain from doing something.  By con-
trast, specific performance is particularly important “to con-
tractual obligations to do something or to abstain from doing 
something.”132F132  It can also be required by the creditor, regard-
less of whether the contract at issue is long-term or not.  More-
over, hardship applies to both monetary and non-monetary ob-
ligations, while specific performance can only be excluded 
under Article 7.2.2(b) of the UNIDROIT Principles with regard 
                                                 
126 Schwenzer, supra note 104, at 296. 
127 Schelhaas, supra note 105, at 787; Lando, supra note 2, at 471. 
128 Southerington, supra note 19, at n. 4.1. 
129 Id.; Carlsen, supra note 3, at 13. 
130 Liu, supra note 117, at 29. 
131 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.2, cmt. 5 (2004), available at 
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to the non-monetary obligations. 
The parties are usually expected to have taken into consid-
eration events that might affect the equilibrium of their con-
tract.133
Under Article 6.2.2, there is a hardship situation where 
the balance between the two parties of the contract has been 
disrupted due to drastic changes in the market after conclusion 
that fundamentally altered the equilibrium of the contract. 
  Therefore, under Article 6.2.1 of the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples, “[w]here the performance of a contract becomes more 
onerous for one of the parties, that party is nevertheless bound 
to perform its obligations subject to the following provisions on 
hardship.” 
Article 7.2.2(b) of the UNIDROIT Principles entails that 
performance cannot be required if changes in the circums-
tances after the conclusion of the contract make it unreasona-
bly onerous or expensive to enforce the contract.  Therefore, 
this exception is not limited to the kind of supervening event 
cases covered by the "hardship."134  Indeed, the extent of alte-
ration of the contractual equilibrium shall not be so fundamen-
tal like the hardship situation.135  Whether all conditions that 
the hardship event has to satisfy under Article 6.2.2 are met is 
not considered when invoking the defense of specific perfor-
mance under Article 7.2.2(b). For example, specific perfor-
mance should be excluded in cases in which such performance 
becomes unreasonably onerous or expensive due to an event 
that was not beyond the control of the debtor.136
Moreover, as the Official Comment on Article 7.2.2 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles makes a cross-reference to the hardship 
provisions in Articles 6.2.1 – 6.2.3,
 
137
                                                 
133 Kessedjian, supra note 24, at 416. 
 hardship can obviously be 
134 For a different opinion, see Carlsen, supra note 3, at 8  (“the require-
ments for applying Article 7.2.2(b) are the same as the requirements under 
Article 6.2.”). 
135 Schwenzer, supra note 104, at 296, (“the requirements for the exclu-
sion of the right to performance should not be as high as those for hardship.”). 
136 Id.   
137 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, art. 7.2.2, cmt. 3-b (2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralve
rsionprinciples2004-e.pdf (“As to other possible consequences arising from 
drastic changes of circumstances amounting to a case of hardship, see Arts. 
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applied as a defense against specific performance.138  Since the 
hardship provisions are placed under section 6 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles regarding performance of the contract, it 
follows that it was intended as a defense against specific per-
formance.139
It is worth mentioning that the cross-reference to hardship 
is made by the Official Comment on Article 7.2.2 that deals 
with performance of non-monetary obligation.  With regards to 
performance of monetary obligations, by contrast, there is no 
cross-reference to hardship in the Official Comment on Article 
7.2.1.  However, the Official Comment on Article 6.2.2 (defini-
tion of hardship) states,"[t]he performance may be that either 
of a monetary or a non-monetary obligation."  Thus, the hard-
ship defense would apply as a defense against specific perfor-
mance of both monetary and non-monetary obligations.
 
140
By contrast, where performance of the contract becomes 
“unreasonably burdensome or expensive,” the debtor might on-
ly invoke the exception to specific performance under Article 
7.2.2(b).  As the alteration of the contractual equilibrium is not 
so fundamental, and consequently there is no hardship situa-
tion, the debtor cannot invoke the rules of section 6.2 (hard-
ship) of the UNIDROIT Principles.  This is emphasized by the 
fact that the Official Comment on Article 6.2.2 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles does not make any cross-reference to the 
specific performance exception in Article 7.2.2.  Rather, the 
cross-reference was  made to Article 7.1.7 on force majeure.
 
141
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138 Schelhaas, supra note 105, at 791; Zahraa & Ghith, supra note 107, at 
760, n. 69. 
139 Carlsen, supra note 3, at 8. 
140 Id.   
141 In this respect, it is further noted in the Official Comment that In 
view of the respective definitions of hardship and force majeure (see Art. 
7.1.7) under these Principles there may be factual situations which can at the 
same time be considered as cases of hardship and of force majeure. If this is 
the case, it is for the party affected by these events to decide which remedy to 
pursue. If it invokes force majeure, it is with a view to its non-performance 
being excused. If, on the other hand, a party invokes hardship, this is in the 
first instance for the purpose of renegotiating the terms of the contract so as 
to allow the contract to be kept alive although on revised terms. UNIDROIT 
PRINCIPLES, art. 6.2.2, cmt. 6 (2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/eng-
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If hardship and performance being unreasonably burden-
some or expensive overlap, it must be decided which one has 
priority over the other in application.  According to an opinion, 
hardship calls for more specific rules that prevail over the ex-
ception stipulated in Article 7.2.2(b).142  It is argued, however, 
that the debtor shall choose which doctrine he wants to rely on, 
the hardship doctrine or the doctrine relating to performance 
as unreasonably burdensome or expensive143
V.  CONCLUSION 
. This is made 
clear by the cross-reference by the Official Comment on Article 
7.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles to the hardship provisions in 
Article 6.2. 
In conclusion, it is worth emphasizing the hardship event 
fundamentally alters the original contractual equilibrium; it 
must also satisfy certain conditions, mentioned in Article 6.2.2 
of the UNIDROIT Principles. Once there is a hardship situa-
tion, the contract can be adapted or terminated by the parties 
or the court.  The court may also direct the parties to resume 
negotiations to reach an agreement adapting the contract or 
confirm the terms of the contract as originally agreed.  In con-
trast, if performance of the obligation by the debtor is unrea-
sonably burdensome or expensive, specific performance may 
not be claimed by the creditor or granted to him.  Instead, the 
creditor may claim damages. Here, the conditions of Article 
6.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles must not be satisfied. 
Therefore, it is obvious that, in a situation of hardship, the 
debtor can choose to invoke either the rules of section 6.2 
(hardship) or the defense to specific performance under Article 
7.2.2(b) of the UNIDROIT Principles.  In contrast, where per-
formance of the contract becomes “unreasonably burdensome or 
expensive,” the debtor might only invoke the exception to spe-
cific performance under Article 7.2.2(b) of the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples. 
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